CHAPTER
28
FINANCE IN MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT
FRANCK
JOVANOVIC
Introduction
This chapter analyzes the
place of modern finance1 in modern economic theories. Financial
theory and economics are closely linked. Indeed, the integration of market
analysis into economic theory in the 1960s was what enabled modern financial
theory to emerge. While some works on what was to become modern financial
theory had been produced prior to the 1960s, they were marginal2 and
did not yet constitute either an academic or a scientific discipline; applied
mathematics and empirical investigations into finance existed, but these were
isolated contributions, and most of them did not have a solid theoretical
underpinning.3
In order to analyze the
place of finance in economics, this chapter sets out to show how economics has
influenced, and continues to influence, modern financial theory.
The chapter is structured as
follows. The first part focuses on the theoretical foundations of modern
financial theory. It analyzes the way modern probability theory and economics
were linked together to create modern financial theory. The second part
presents the key works of the dominant paradigm of financial economics, which
was built during the 1960s and the 1970s. It shows how major concepts and hypotheses
from economics were integrated into mathematical models. The third part looks
at anomalies that have emerged since the end of the 1970s and are inconsistent
with the dominant paradigm. It explains how financial economics has developed
alternative theories— financial market microstructure and behavioral finance—to
resolve these anomalies. (However, as will be explained, these developments
have not led to any significant modification of the dominant paradigm in
financial economics, even if its foundations have been called into question.)
The last part deals with two major approaches born outside financial
economics—social studies of financial markets and econophysics—which are among
the greatest challenges to the foundations of the dominant paradigm of
financial economics today.
FINANCE IN MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 547
Modern financial theory was born in the
early 1960s. Two scientific disciplines played a fundamental role in its
emergence: modern probability theory and economics.
Modern financial theory is
intimately bound up with modern probability theory, from which its emergence,
main models, and results are inseparable. So close are the links that, further
to the publications of Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska
(1981),4 it could be suggested that economics has been dispossessed
of financial theory, which has since resembled an application of modern probability
theory (MacKenzie 2006: 140-1). Or, as posited by Davis and Etheridge, Harrison
and Pliska’s article (1981) “has turned ‘financial economics’ into
‘mathematical finance’ ” (Davis and Etheridge 2006: 114).
Modern probability
theory—that is, probability for continuous quantities in continuous
time—emerged in the 1930s (Von Plato 1994) out of a number of works aimed at
renewing traditional probability theory. The development of the modern version
of probability theory was directly based on measurement theory (Shafer and Vovk
2001). The connection was made by Kolmogorov, who proposed the main founding
concepts of this new branch of mathematics.
From these beginnings in the
1930s, modern probability theory developed and became increasingly influential.
But it was not until after World War II that Kolmogorov’s axioms became the
dominant paradigm in this discipline (Shafer and Vovk 2005: 54-5). It was also
after World War II that the American probability school was born, led by Doob5
and by Feller.6 These two writers had a major influence on the
construction of modern probability theory, particularly through their two main
books, published in the early 1950s,7 which proved, on the basis of
the framework laid down by Kolmogorov, all results obtained prior to the 1950s,
thereby enabling them to be accepted and integrated into the discipline’s
theoretical corpus. These 1950s works led to the creation of a stable corpus
that was accessible to nonspecialists. From then on, the models and results of
modern probability theory were used in the study of financial markets in a more
systematic manner, in particular by scholars educated in economics.
The first step in this development was the dissemination of mathematical
tools enabling the properties of random variables to be used and uncertainty
reasoning to be developed. The first two writers to use tools that came out of
modern probability theory
to study financial markets
were Harry Markowitz and A. D. Roy. In 1952 each published an article on the
theory of portfolio choice theory.8 Both used mathematical
properties of random variables to build their model.9 Their work was
to re-prove a result that had long been known (and which was as old as the
adage “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket”) using a new mathematical
language, that of modern probability theory. Their contribution, then, lay not
in the result of portfolio diversification, but in the use of this new
mathematical language.
In 1958, Modigliani and
Miller proceeded in the same manner: they used random variables in the analysis
of an old question, the capital structure of companies, to demonstrate that
the value of a company is independent of its capital structure.1 0
Their contribution, like that of Markowitz and Roy, was to reformulate an old
problem using the terms of modern probability theory.
From the 1960s on, a new stage was embarked
upon: authors no longer limited themselves to proving past results using the
mathematical formalisms of modern probability theory, but connected
mathematical formalism with the main concepts of economics, particularly the
concept of equilibrium, to create new theories.
The institutional birth of
modern financial theory arose precisely from the integration of economics’
analysis framework into the study of financial markets (Jovanovic 2008). This
integration was the result of the formation in the early 1960s of a community
of economists devoted to the analysis of financial markets.
Let us remember that until
the 1960s, finance in the United States was taught mainly in business schools.
The textbooks used were very practical and few of them touched on what became
modern financial theory. The research work that formed the basis of modern
financial theory was carried out by isolated writers who were trained in
economics or were surrounded by economists, such as Working, Cowles, Kendal,
Roy, Markowitz, and so on. No university community devoted to the subject
existed prior to the 1960s.!' During the 1960s and 1970s, training in American
business schools changed radically, becoming more “rigorous.”!2 They
began to “academicize” themselves, recruiting increasing numbers of economics
professors who taught in university economics departments, such as Miller (Fama
2008). Similarly, prior to offering their own doctoral programs, business
schools recruited doctorands who had been trained in university economics
departments.
The recruitment of
economists interested in questions of finance unsettled teaching and research
as hitherto practiced in business schools and inside the American Finance
Association. The new recruits brought with them their analysis frameworks,
methods, hypotheses, and concepts, and also used the new mathematics that arose
out of modern probability theory. These changes and their consequences were
substantial enough for the American Finance Association to devote part of its
annual meeting to them in two consecutive years, 1965 and 1966.
At the 1965 annual meeting of the American
Finance Association an entire session was devoted to the necessity to rethink
courses in finance curricula. Paul Wendt discussed the development of finance
and explained:
As most of you are aware, a modern concept of technical
market analysis is emerging which emphasizes the application of newer
analytical techniques and computer technology to test traditional and new
theories of stock price behavior. I am prepared to accept the view that this
is not only a promising research area, but that graduate business school
students should be introduced to these emerging theories and techniques of
analyzing security market behavior. (Wendt 1966: 421-2)
At the 1966 annual meeting,
the new President of the American Finance Association presented a paper on “The
State of the Finance Field" in which he talked of the changes being
brought about by “the creators of the New Finance [who] become impatient with
the slowness with which traditional materials and teaching techniques move
along” (Weston 1967: 539).13 Although these changes elicited many
debates (Jovanovic 2008; MacKenzie 2006; Poitras and Jovanovic 2007, 2010;
Whitley 1986a, 1986b),!4 none succeeded in challenging the global
movement.
The antecedents of these new
actors were a determining factor in the institutionalization of modern
financial theory. Their background in economics allowed them to add theoretical
content to the empirical results that had been accumulated since the 1930s and
to the mathematical formalisms that had arisen from modern probability theory.
In other words, economics brought the theoretical content that had been
missing. Here are two examples to illustrate this change: the efficient markets
theory and the CAPM.
The efficient markets
theory,!5 which can be considered as the first theory built by
financial economists, was initially referred to as the “random walk theory”
This term stresses the importance of mathematical formalism in the way issues
were tackled before the discipline was constituted. The theory was first
formulated by Fama (1965)—we will return to it in the next section—who developed
the idea that the random walk model would test two properties of competitive
economic balance: the absence of marginal profit and a security’s equilibrium
value. According to the efficient markets theory, if the model used by
investors to evaluate the value of the security does not use all available
information, it will be possible to make an arbitrage. Thus, in an efficient
market, the equalization between the price and the equilibrium value means that
all available information is included in the price. Consequently, it is not
possible to use past information to predict future price changes: present and
future prices are independent of past prices. For this reason, in an efficient
market, stock price changes must be as random as the arrival of new information.
In other words, according to this theory, the random walk model can simulate
the dynamic evolution of equilibrium prices in a competitive market. In this
way, the efficient markets theory made it possible to link the mathematical
model of a stochastic process with one of the keystones of economics, the
concept of economic equilibrium.
In 1970, Fama based the
efficient markets theory on another mathematical concept that came from modern
probability theory: the martingale models6 For Fama’s purposes, the
most important attraction of the martingale formalism was its explicit reference
to a set of information.17 As such, the martingale model could be
used to test the implication of the efficient markets theory that, if all
available information is used, the expected profit is nil. This idea led to the
definition of an efficient market that is generally used nowadays: “a market
in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information is called
‘efficient’ ” (Fama 1970: 383). Here again, the part played by economics in the
mathematical definition of the martingale model underlines economics’ key role
in the creation of the structure of modern financial theory.
The second illustration of
how economics brought theoretical content to mathematical formalisms is the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM). In finance, the CAPM is used to determine a
theoretically appropriate required rate of return for an asset, if the asset is
to be added to an already well-diversified portfolio, given the asset’s
non-diversifiable risk. The model takes into account the asset’s sensitivity to
non-diversifiable risk (also known as systematic risk or market risk or beta),
as well as the expected return of the market and the expected return of a
theoretical risk-free asset. This model is used for pricing an individual
security or a portfolio. It has become the cornerstone of modern finance (Fama
and French 2004). The CAPM is also built using an approach familiar to
economists for three reasons. First, some sort of maximizing behavior on the
part of participants in a market is assumed; second, the equilibrium conditions
under which such markets will clear are investigated; third, markets are
perfectly competitive. Consequently, the CAPM provided a standard financial
theory for market equilibrium under uncertainty.
The imbrication of the mathematical
formalisms that emerged from modern probability theory and economics concepts
theory in particular, was a crucial factor in the birth of financial economics.
By linking financial facts with economic concepts, the efficient market theory
enabled financial economics to become a proper subfield of economics and
consequently a scientific field. As we will now see, the heart of the dominant
paradigm was constructed during this period on the same model as the efficient
markets theory and the CAPM.
The decade of the 1960s saw
the creation of the dominant paradigm of financial economics.! s Contributions
were numerous and substantive. It should be noted that almost all those who
contributed to the construction of this paradigm have been rewarded by the Bank
of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel,w a
measure of this paradigm’s importance in economics. Five individuals—Harry M.
Markowitz, William F. Sharpe, Merton H. Miller, Robert C. Merton, and Myron S.
Scholes—have received this distinction for contributions solely in the realm of
financial economics. Markowitz, Sharpe, and Miller were joint winners in 1990,
and Merton and Scholes received the award jointly in 1997.20 In
addition, four other Nobel Prize winners—Paul A. Samuelson (1970), John R.
Hicks (1972), Franco Modigliani (1985), and Daniel Kahneman (2002)—made
significant contributions to financial economics but were awarded the prize for
an overall impact that covers a wider range of the economic sciences.
The dominant paradigm is
made up of four main theories: the efficient market theory, the CAPM,21
the mean-variance portfolio optimization model, and the option pricing model. I
will now present these briefly.
As explained above, the
efficient markets theory 22 considers that stock market prices
fluctuate randomly because all information is fully reflected in the prices.
Although detailed empirical observations about the random character of security
prices stretch back to the nineteenth century (Jovanovic and Le Gall 2001,
Poitras 2006), these notions were crystallized into the basis of the efficient
markets theory during the 1960s. Working (1956) was the first author to suggest
a theoretical explanation of the random character of stock market prices; he
established an explicit link between the unpredictable arrival of information
and the random character of stock market price changes. However, this article
made no link with economic equilibrium and, probably for this reason, it was
not largely circulated. Instead it was Roberts (1959: 7), a professor at the
University of Chicago, who first suggested a link between economic concepts and
the random walk model by using the “arbitrage proof” argument that had been
popularized by Modigliani and Miller (1958). Cowles (1960: 914-5) then made an
important step by identifying a link between financial econometric results and
economic equilibrium. Finally, two years later, Cootner (1962: 25) linked the
random walk model, information, and economic equilibrium, and set out the idea
of the efficient markets theory, although he did not use that expression. It
was a University of Chicago scholar, Eugene Fama, who formulated the efficient
markets theory, giving it its first theoretical account in his 1965 doctoral
thesis. In 1970, Fama developed the connection between security prices fully
reflecting available information and martingale behavior for security prices,
laying the foundation for a future connection between the equivalent martingale
measure and absence of arbitrage in security prices. At the same time, Fama et
al. (1969) proposed a statistical methodology that was applicable to testing the
“semi-strong form” version of the efficient markets theory, solidifying the
empirical case against the strongest pillar of the old finance—security
analysis.
The efficient markets theory
was a crucial building block for modern financial economics. If markets are
efficient, then techniques for selecting individual securities will not
generate abnormal returns. In such a world, the best strategy for a rational
person seeking to maximize expected utility is to diversify optimally.
Achieving the highest level of expected return for a given level of risk
involves eliminating firm-specific risk by combining securities into optimal
portfolios. Building on Markowitz (1952, 1959), Treynor (1961), Sharpe (a PhD
student of Markowitz’s) (Sharpe 1963, 1964), Lintner (1965a, 1965b), and Mossin
(1966) made key theoretical contributions to the development of CAPM and the
single factor model. A new definition of risk was thus provided. It is not the
total variance of a security return that determines the expected return.
Rather, only the systematic risk—that portion of total variance that cannot be
diversified away—will be rewarded with expected return. An ex ante measure of systematic risk—the beta of a security—is
proposed and the single factor model used to motivate ex post empirical estimation of this parameter. Leading
figures of the modern financial economics network, such as Miller, Scholes,
and Black, examined the inherent difficulties in determining empirical
estimates and developed important techniques designed to provide such
estimates. A collection that promoted these important contributions was the
volume edited by Jensen (1972).
The combination of these three essential
elements—the efficient markets theory, the Markowitz mean-variance portfolio
optimization model, and the CAPM—constitute the core elements of analytical
progress on modern portfolio theory during the 1960s. Just as a decade of
improvement and refinement of modern portfolio theory was about to commence,
another kernel of insight contained in Cootner (1964) came to fruition with the
appearance of Black and Scholes (1973).23 Though the influential
Samuelson (1967) was missing from the edited volume, Cootner (1964) did
provide, along with other studies of option pricing, an English translation of Bachelier’s
1900 thesis and a chapter by C. M. Sprenkle (1964). The Sprenkle chapter points
back to Sprenkle (1961) where the partial differential equation-based solution
procedure employed by Black and Scholes was initially presented (MacKenzie
2003, 2007). Black and Scholes (1973) marks the beginning of another scientific
movement—concerned with contingent claims pricing—that was to be larger in
practical impact and substantially deeper in analytical complexity. The
Black-Scholes-Merton model is based on the creation of a replicating portfolio
which, if the model is clearly specified and its hypotheses tested, holds out
the possibility of locally eliminating risk in financial markets. From a
theoretical point of view, this model allows for a particularly fruitful
connection with the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model, giving it a degree
of reality for the first time.24
Hardly had the theoretical
framework of the dominant paradigm been laid down when a number of works
seriously challenged its foundations. A first set of studies called into
question the theoretical bases of the dominant paradigm. In 1976, LeRoy showed
that Fama’s (1970) demonstration of the efficient markets theory was
tautological and not testable. In 1977, the same criticism was leveled at the
CAPM: Roll (1977) asserted that the CAPM is tautological and is hard to test
empirically since stock indexes and other measures of the market are poor
proxies for the CAPM variables. LeRoy (1973) and
Lucas (1978) provided
theoretical proofs that efficient markets and the martingale hypothesis are two
distinct ideas: the martingale is neither necessary nor sufficient for an
efficient market. Although this criticism does not strictly speaking call into
question the efficiency of markets, it shows that the first objective of the
efficient markets theory (the creation of a link between a mathematical model
and the concept of economic equilibrium) had not been fully achieved. However,
the criticism from Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) was
more serious: they demonstrated that because information involves costs,
perfectly informational efficient markets are impossible.
In parallel with these
theoretical attacks, a number of empirical studies very soon contradicted the
conclusions of the dominant paradigm. At a 1969 conference, Fischer Black,
Michael Jensen, and Myron Scholes presented data demonstrating that the CAPM
does not appear to adequately explain the variation in stock returns; their
results were published three years later (Black, Jensen, and Scholes 1972).
Similarly, Douglas (1969) showed that the CAPM did not provide a complete
description of the structure of security returns. Similar studies were
produced throughout the 1970s. These empirical studies gave birth to what is
known as the “anomalies literature,” which has become important and well
organized since the 1980s. During the 1970s, the number of these anomalies and
their significance for the dominant paradigm were so great that as early as
1978 a special issue of the Journal
of Financial Economics was devoted to them.
Here is a quick summary of four of these
anomalies.25
Keim (1983) and Reinganum (1983) showed that
much of the abnormal return to small firms occurs during the first two weeks in
January. This anomaly became known as the “turn-of-the-year effect.” French
(1980) observed another calendar anomaly. He noted that the average return to
the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) composite portfolio was reliably negative
over weekends in the period 1953-77.
The winner’s curse points out a tendency for
the winning bid in an auction setting to exceed the intrinsic value of the item
purchased. This suggests that investors are not rational enough to be aware of
the true value of some assets (Thaler 1994).
Shiller (1981) published a
study of the American market demonstrating that the volatility of stock market
prices was greater than expected according to the standard framework.
Banz (1981) and Reinganum
(1981) showed that between 1936 and 1975 small-capitaliza- tion firms on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) earned average returns higher than CAPM
predictions.
The anomalies attracted
greater attention than theoretical criticism. Doubtless this was because, as
Frankfurter and McGoun (2002) explained, anomalies were not initially perceived
as challenges to the dominant paradigm; on the contrary, they were part of the
paradigm. Nevertheless, this accumulation of divergences between empirical data
and theoretical hypotheses set out by the dominant approach led to a
theoretical diversification (Schinckus 2008, 2009a).
In the 1980s there emerged two alternative
theoretical approaches that took as their starting point a questioning of these
anomalies and of the main hypotheses of the dominant framework. These two
approaches were behavioral finance and financial market microstructure. Both
directly called upon the informational efficiency theory that, as we have seen,
was a crucial element in the birth of modern financial theory.
Although the theory of
financial market microstructure has been developing since the 1980s,26
the first works appeared closer to 1970 with an article by Demsetz (1968),
which looked at how to match up buyers and sellers to find a price when orders
do not arrive synchronously. In 1971, Jack Treynor, Editor in chief of the Financial Analysts Journal from 1969 to 1981, published
a short article under the pseudonym of Walter Bagehot, “The Only Game in Town,”
in which he analyzed the consequences when traders have different motivations
for trading. Maureen O’Hara, one of the leading lights of this theoretical
trend, defined market microstructure as “the study of the process and outcomes
of exchanging assets under a specific set of rules” (1995). Financial market
microstructure focuses on how specific trading mechanisms and how strategic
comportments affect the price formation process. This field deals with issues
of market structure and design, price formation and price discovery,
transaction and timing cost, information and disclosure, and market-maker and
investor behavior.
Like the dominant paradigm
of financial economics, financial market microstructure takes its theoretical
foundation and its method from economics, new microeconomics in particular.
Some of its hypotheses, however, are completely opposed to the dominant
paradigm in financial economics. Likewise, the mathematical formalisms it uses
differ from those of the dominant paradigm.
As regards mathematical
formalisms, this theory largely uses the same mathematics as the new
microeconomics (it uses asymmetric information) and chiefly employs a Bayesian
probability approach. On this point it differs from the mathematical models
traditionally used by the dominant paradigm, which mainly employ a frequentist
probability approach.
As regards theoretical hypotheses, a central
idea in the theory of market microstructure is that asset prices do not fully
reflect all available information even if all participants are rational.
Indeed, information may be unequally distributed between, and differently interpreted
by, market participants. This hypothesis stands in total contradiction to the
efficient markets hypothesis defended by the dominant paradigm. The first
generation of market microstructure literature has shown that trades have both
a transitory and a permanent impact on prices (Biais, Glosten, and Spatt 2005).
For instance, Copeland and Galai (1983) showed that a dealer who cannot
distinguish between informed and uninformed investors will always set a
positive spread to compensate for the expected loss that he will incur if
there is a positive probability of some investors being informed. Kyle (1985)
suggests that informed dealers can develop strategic behavior to profit from
their information by concealing their orders among those of non-informed
dealers. While informed dealers thus maximize their own profits on the basis of
the information they hold, their behavior restricts the dissemination of the
information. O’Hara (2003) presents another example of results that contradict
the dominant paradigm. In this article, she shows that, if information is
asymmetrically distributed, and if those who do not have information know that
others know more, contrary to the suggestions of the CAPM, we will not get an
equilibrium where everyone holds the market portfolio.
The
second alternative approach is behavioral finance.
In 1985 Werner F. M. De
Bondt and Richard Thaler published “Does the Stock Market Overreact?”
effectively marking the start of what has become known as behavioral finance.
Behavioral finance studies the influence of psychology on the behavior of financial
practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets.27 Its
theoretical framework is drawn mainly from behavioral economics.
Behavioral economics uses
social, cognitive, and emotional factors to understand the economic decisions
of economic agents performing economic functions, and their effects on market
prices and resource allocation. It is primarily concerned with the bounds of
rationality of economic agents. The first important article came from Kahneman28
and Tversky (1979), who used cognitive psychology to explain various
divergences of economic decision-making from neoclassical theory.
There exists as yet no unified theory of
behavioral finance.29 According to Schinckus (2009b), however, it is
possible to characterize this new school of thought on the basis of three
hypotheses common to all the literature:
• The existence of behavioral
biases affecting investor behavior. This is a fundamental hypothesis that
arises directly out of observations conducted in laboratories by cognitive
psychologists. These behavioral biases are thought to be the main cause of
differences between the observed behavior of agents and the rational behavior
on which standard financial economics is based.
556 FRANCK JOVANOVIC
• The existence of bias in
investors’ perception of the environment that affects their decisions.
Behavioral finance thus presumes that the environment is opaque to individuals.
This hypothesis comes from observations conducted in the laboratory and
diverges from the dominant paradigm, which presumes that the context is
completely transparent to investors’ perceptions.
•
The existence of systematic errors in the processing of
information by individuals, which affects the market’s informational
efficiency. The markets are therefore presumed to be informationally
inefficient. This hypothesis is the cause of the first two hypotheses.
Like those of financial
market microstructure, the hypotheses of behavioral finance are opposed to
those of the dominant paradigm. In addition, these two alternative schools
agree on one major point: although they oppose the dominant paradigm, both draw
their theoretical origins from economics. Through both these schools we see the
importance of economics in the development of modern financial theory, which
demonstrates the difficulty of reducing modern financial theory to a simple
“mathematical finance.”
In parallel with this theoretical
diversification founded on economics, certain foundations of the dominant
paradigm of financial economics are today being questioned by two new research
fields outside of economics.
As we have explained, so-called “modern”
financial theory is intrinsically linked with economics. Not only did
economics provide the theoretical content necessary for the emergence of the
dominant paradigm, but it also enabled the development of the two main
alternative approaches, behavioral finance and financial market microstructure.
But although economics has given theoretical content to modern financial
theory, certain fundamentals ofthe dominant paradigm are today being
challenged by two new research fields from outside economics. Two major
approaches born outside financial economics emerged since the 1990s: social
studies of financial markets and econophysics. Both challenge the foundations
of the dominant paradigm of financial economics. These two theoretical trends
are likely to influence the hypotheses of financial economics in the coming
years.
Social studies of finance
started to emerge in the 1990s. This multidisciplinary field, which I will not
cover here (it is dealt with elsewhere in this volume), results from the
application to financial markets of social
science disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and social studies of
science. The sociology of financial markets approaches financial markets from a
sociological perspective (Cardon, Lehingue, and Muniesa 2000; Knorr Cetina and
Preda 2005; MacKenzie 2006; Preda 2009). It seeks to provide an adequate
sociological conceptualization of financial markets, and examines who the
actors within them are, how they operate, within which networks, and how these
networks are structured. One of the main concepts advanced by this field is
the idea of per- formativity. According to MacKenzie (2006) and MacKenzie,
Muniesa, and Siu (2007), financial models have performativity; they do not just
describe markets, they transform them.
The second main approach
that was born outside financial economics is econophysics.30 Very
broadly speaking, econophysics refers to the extension of physics to the study
of problems generally considered as falling within the sphere of economics.31
Financial economics, and more generally finance, are also subject to the
influence of physics. One of the first authors to bring physics closer to the
financial domain was Jules Regnault in the second half of the nineteenth
century.32 In the twentieth century, a number of physics concepts
played a part in the development of modern financial theory. But as McCauley
points out (2004), in spite of these theoretical and historical links between
physics and finance, econophysics represents a fundamentally new approach. Its
practitioners are not economists taking their inspiration from the work of
physicists to develop their discipline, as has been seen repeatedly in the
history of economics. This time, it is physicists that are going beyond the
boundaries of their discipline, using their methods to study various problems
thrown up by social sciences. Econophysicists are not attempting to integrate
physics concepts into financial economics as it exists today, but are rather
seeking to ignore, even to deny this discipline in an endeavor to replace the
theoretical framework that currently dominates it with a new framework derived
directly from statistical physics.33
This movement was initiated
in the 1970s, when certain physicists began publishing articles devoted to
study of social phenomena, such as the formation of social groups (Weidlich
1971) or social mimetism (Callen and Shapiro 1974).34 The next
decade confirmed this new theoretical trend (labeled sociophysics 35), as the number of physicists
publishing papers devoted to the explanation of social phenomena and the number
of themes analyzed continued to increase, examples being industrial strikes
(Galam, Gefen, and Shapir 1982), democratic structures (Galam 1986), and
elections (Galam 2004, Ferreira and Dionisio 2008).
In the 1990s physicists36
turned their attention to economics, and particularly financial economics,
giving rise to econophysics. Although the movement’s official birth
announcement came in a 1996 article by Stanley et al. (1996),37
econophysics was at that time still a young, ill-defined current. Mantegna and
Stanley (1999: 2) defined econo-
558 FRANCK JOVANOVIC
physics as “a quantitative
approach using ideas, models, conceptual and computational methods of
statistical physics” Research conducted in this field mainly concerns the study
of financial phenomena, ignoring other themes analyzed by economics.38
Econophysics has two main
strengths that allow it to challenge the dominant paradigm of financial
economics: a better explanation of empirical facts, and mathematical models
that are more general than those used by financial economists.
Believing that financial
market prices change more frequently and in a more orderly manner than presumed
by the Gaussian model on which financial economics is based, econophysicists
use Levy distributions to describe financial data. Such distributions better
describe the statistical distributions observed on financial markets. 39
This approach allows them to integrate a number of stylized facts such as “fat
tails”40 “volatility persistence”41 and “volatility
clustering”42 that the traditional approach cannot explain
(Jovanovic and Schinckus 2010a).
Econophysics’ second strength lies in the
use of mathematical models that generalize those used in financial economics.
The main mathematical tools used by econophysicists are Levy processes, which
provide a more general mathematical framework, making Gaussian or Poisson
processes particular cases. This use of Levy processes, then, allows
econophysics to provide a more general theoretical framework than that of financial
economics, which uses Gaussian distribution.
Notes
1.
Modern financial theory and financial economics are
synonymous. We use the two terms interchangeably here.
2.
Examples are the works of Jules Regnault (1863), Louis
Bachelier (1900), Vincenz Bronzin (1908), Alfred Cowles (1933, 1944), and
Holbrook Working (1934, 1935).
3.
Let me specify that the absence of theory characterizes
all existing works written between the 1930s and the 1960s. Cowles (1933),
Working (1934), and Kendall (1953) were the first English and American authors
to analyze the random character of stock prices, but none of them put forward a
theory to explain the phenomenon. Theoreticians pointed out the absence of
theoretical explanations during the 1950s. This was particularly striking after
the Koopmans-Vining debate in the late 1940s, which set the NBER against the
Cowles Commission over the lack of theoretical explanations and the need to
link measurement with theory (Jovanovic 2008).
4.
These two publications gave a rigorous mathematical
framework to definitions, hypotheses, and results that constitute the heart of
modern financial theory.
5.
Doob is without question the American mathematician who
has had the greatest influence on modern probability theory in the United
States. On Doob, see Bingham (2005).
6.
William Feller immigrated to the United States in 1939.
He was one of the first defenders of the axiomatization proposed by Kolmogorov
(Shafer and Vovk 2005). At the colloquium on mathematical probability held in
Geneva in October 1937, Feller declared that Kolmogorov’s well-known axiomatization
was the point of departure for most modern theoretical research in probability
(Shafer and Vovk 2005: 57). Moreover, Feller’s An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Application (1950) was, like Doob’s
1953
publication, one of the works that most
strongly influenced modern probability theory in the United States.
7.
Doob “finally provided the definitive treatment of
stochastic processes within the measure-theoretic framework, in his Stochastic Processes (1953)” (Shafer and Vovk 2005: 60). Doob
worked on martingale theory from 1940 to 1950. Knowledge of martingale theory
was spread gradually during the 1950s, mostly through Stochastic Processes (Meyer 2009). This book “became the Bible
of the new probability” (Meyer 2009: 3).
8.
For a retrospective on Markowitz, see Rubinstein (2002)
and Markowitz (1999).
9.
The mathematical properties of random variables are
that the expected value of a weighted sum is the weighted sum of the expected
values, while the variance of a weighted sum is not the weighted sum of the
variances (because we have to take covariance into account).
10.
This theorem can actually be thought of as an extension
of the “separation theorem” originally developed by Irving Fisher (1930). For
an introduction to the work of Fisher, see Dimand and Geanakoplos (2005). For a
retrospective look at the Modigliani and Miller model, see Miller (1988) and
Rubinstein (2003).
11.
The new research path was not accepted by economists
until the 1960s. Milton Friedman’s reaction to Harry Markowitz’s defense of his
PhD thesis gives a good illustration. Friedman declared, “It’s not economics,
it’s not mathematics, it’s not business administration,” and Jacob Marschak,
who supervised Markowitz during his PhD, added, “It’s not literature”
(Markowitz 2004). See also Rubinstein (2002). Another illustration is provided
by the dissemination of the first works of financial economics, which only
truly started to circulate from the 1960s onward. For example, citations of
Markowitz’ 1952 study really only began in the mid-1960s, once the founding
articles of the CAPM had appeared (Jovanovic and Schinckus 2010c).
12.
See Mackenzie (2006: 72-3), Whitley (1986a, 1986b),
Fourcade and Khurana (2009), and Bernstein (1992).
13.
The same issues were raised in training sessions given
by Financial Analysts Seminar, one of the leading professional organizations
connected with financial markets (Kennedy 1966).
14.
David Durand, professor at MIT, used his prestigious
academic position to question the rise of modern financial economics (Durand
1959, 1968). Mackenzie (2007) observes: “[w]hen in 1968 David Durand, a leading
figure from the older form of the academic study of finance, inspected the
mathematical models that were beginning to transform his field he commented
that ‘The new finance men . . . have lost virtually all contact with terra
firma.’ ”
15.
This theory is sometimes called a hypothesis. But from
a methodological point of view, it is a fully fledged theory, even if it is
used as a hypothesis in some models.
16.
The martingale model had been introduced to model the
random character of stock market prices by Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot
(1966).
17.
By definition, a martingale model, E(PJ®)-P=0, ^ is a filter, that is,
using the terminology of financial economics, a set of information that
increases over time.
18.
This section is based on Poitras and Jovanovic (2010)
and Jovanovic (2010). For a historical perspective, see also Bernstein (1992),
MacKenzie (2006), Mehrling (2005), and Jovanovic and Schinckus (2010c).
19.
A notable exception is Eugene Fama. It was expected
that he would receive the award in 2008, but the financial crisis worked
against him.
20.
Although the contributions of Fischer Black (1938-95)
were explicitly recognized, he was not a named recipient because the prize
cannot be awarded posthumously, and the award was given to Merton and Scholes.
21.
We might also add the arbitrage pricing theory. This
theory was initiated by the economist Stephen Ross in 1976. It assumes that the
expected return of a financial asset is influenced by various macroeconomic
factors or theoretical market indices.
22.
In fact, there are several definitions of this theory.
The definition has changed depending on the emphasis placed on a given feature
by each author. For instance, Fama et al. (1969) defined an efficient market as
“a market that adjusts rapidly to new information”; Jensen (1978) considered
that “a market is efficient with respect to information set 9t if it is impossible to make economic profit by
trading on the basis of information set 0t”; according to Malkiel (1992) “the
market is said to be efficient with respect to some information set . . . if
security prices would be unaffected by revealing that information to all
participants. Moreover, efficiency with respect to an information set . . .
implies that it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis
of [that information set].”
23.
See Mehrling (2005) on Fischer Black, and MacKenzie
(2006) for a sociology analysis of the influence of this model.
24.
The Black-Scholes-Merton model has been associated ex post with Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium.
Arrow and Debreu (1954) and later Debreu (1959) were able to model an uncertain
economy and show the existence of at least a competitive general equilibrium
which, moreover, had the property of being Pareto optimal. This model thus “for
the first time gave reality to chapter 7 of Gerard Debreu’s book Theorie de la valeur . . . in which he talks of complete
markets, that is, markets in which any contingent asset is replicable by basic
assets” (Geman 1997: 50).
25.
Schwert (2003) provides a fairly exhaustive review of
anomalies.
26.
The term “market microstructure” was coined by Mark
Garman (1976), who studied order flux dynamics (the dealer must set a price so
as to not run out of stock or cash). For a presentation of the discipline, see
O’Hara (1995), Madhavan (2000), and Biais, Glosten, and Spatt (2005).
27.
See Schinckus (2009a, 2009b) for a presentation of this
school and its positioning vis-a- vis the dominant paradigm.
28.
In 2002 Daniel Kahneman received the Bank of Sweden
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for his work on the
integration of psychology with economics.
29.
Note that Shefrin (2002) made a first attempt to unify
the theory.
30.
On the emergence and analysis of econophysics, see
Gingras and Schinckus (2) and Jovanovic and Schinckus (2010a, 2010b).
31.
The influence of physics on economics is nothing new. A
number of writers have studied the “physical attraction” (Le Gall 2002: 5)
exerted by economics on hard sciences: Mirowski (1989) extensively highlighted
contributions of physics to the development of marginalist economics and
mathematical economics. Ingrao and Israel (1990) drew renewed attention to the
influences of mechanics in the conceptualization of equilibrium in economics.
Menard (1981), Schabas (1990), and Maas (2005) also highlighted the role of
physics in the economic works of Cournot and those of Jevons.
32.
See Jovanovic (2000) and Jovanovic and Le Gall (2001)
on this subject.
33.
This explicit desire for methodological rupture
contains the Kuhnian idea of the need for theoretical discontinuity in order to
develop a new paradigm.
34.
Regarding the emergence and history of sociophysics,
see Galam (2004).
35.
This term was proposed by Serge Galam in a 1982
article.
36.
The influence of physics on the study of financial
markets is not new, as witnessed by the work of Bachelier (1900) and Black and
Scholes (1973). Nevertheless, we cannot yet refer to Black and Scholes’s model
as econophysics in the term’s current meaning, since it was com-
FINANCE IN MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 561
pletely integrated into the dominant
theoretical current of economics and finance (Kast 1991). Econophysics is not
an “adapted import” of the methodology used in physics; rather, it is closer to
a “methodological invasion” We return to this point in the next section.
37.
This article is also the origin of the term econophysics.
38.
Although the application of statistical physics to
economic touches on a number of subjects, such as corporate revenue (Okuyama,
Takayasu, and Takayasu 1999), the emergence of money (Shinohara and Gunji 2001)
and global demand (Donangelo and Sneppen
2000)
, these fields are marginal to judge by the number of
articles published by physicists on the subject of financial markets. It is no
accident, then, that the characteristics of econophysics mentioned by Rickles
(2007: 4) all relate to finance.
39.
On this point, we should remember that economists and
financiers have long been interested in the leptokurtic character of price
distributions (Lou^a 2007: 219; Jovanovic and Schinckus 2013).
40.
The distributions of financial returns are more
leptokurtic (with heavy tails) and exhibit a larger number of extreme events
than a Gaussian framework would generate.
41.
According to the theoretical framework used by the
dominant paradigm, security prices have no memory. Technically, however, the volatility has a slowly decaying
autocorrelation showing a dependency between stock market returns.
42. In reality, we can observe
several periods of large fluctuations and periods of small fluctuations. In
other words, periods of intense fluctuations and low fluctuations tend to cluster
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